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1.	The	role	of	philosophy	Philosophy	has	long	been	a	contested	subject,	and	there	have	been,	and	still	are,	many	different	and	often	conflicting	conceptions	of	its	proper	scope	and	aims.	But	if	we	go	back	to	how	its	founding	father,	Socrates,	conceived	of	the	philosophical	enterprise,	we	find	one	element	which	has	continued	to	be	central	to	much	if	not	all	subsequent	philosophizing,	that	of	critical	scrutiny	or	examination	(in	Greek	exetasis),	encapsulated	in	Socrates’	famous	pronouncement	at	his	trial,	‘the	unexamined	life	is	not	worth	living	for	a	human	being’.2	For	Socrates,	such	‘examination’	meant,	in	the	first	place,	a	careful	scrutiny	of	the	meaning	of	our	concepts:	What	do	we	really	mean	by	justice,	or	piety,	or	courage?	Can	we	define	these	notions?;	Do	we	really	understand	the	criteria	for	their	use?	…	and	so	on.	And	of	course	this	basic	feature	of	philosophizing	remains	central	today.	Philosophers	continue	to	be	preoccupied	with	language,	and	with	the	correct	analysis	of	concepts,	both	in	general	use	and	in	the	specialised	disciplines;	indeed,	for	a	fair	time	during	the	latter	part	of	the	twentieth	century,	it	was	held	that	the	analysis	of	language	was	the	only	proper	object	of	philosophy.3		Yet	alongside	what	may	be	called	this	technical	or	professional	concern	with	meaning	and	language,	philosophers	have	very	often	also	had	a	commitment	to	‘examination’	in	a	deeper	sense:	they	have	felt	a	powerful	drive	to	stand	back	from	our	day-to-day	preoccupations	and	concerns	and	to	inquire	into	the	overall	direction	and	purpose	of	our	lives,	and	the	significance	of	our	human	existence.	This	deeper	project	of	examination	also	has	its	roots	in	Socrates,	who	was	patently	committed,	like	many	of	his	successors	in	the	Classical	and	Hellenistic	philosophical	worlds,	to	the	search	for	a	life	of	integrity	and	virtue.	The	wording	of	Socrates’	famous	pronouncement	at	his	trial	should	remind	us	that	philosophical	‘examination’,	for	Socrates,	involved	not	just	a	series	of	abstract	conceptual	puzzles	but	a	critical	scrutiny	of	the	entire	character	of	one’s	life	(bios).	What	is	more,	as	is	made	clear	in	the	Apology,	Socrates’	philosophical	vocation	was	linked	with	an	unwavering	allegiance	to	the	dictates	of	his	conscience,	the	‘divine	sign’,	as	he	put	it,	whose	inner	voice	demanded	his	obedience.4	Socrates	reproaches	his	Athenian	accusers	for	being	very	concerned	with	things	like	money	and	reputation,	but	not	having	the	faintest	concern	for	the	improvement	of	the	most	precious	part	of	themselves	–	their	souls.5	And	he	goes	on	to	explain	that	the	very	activity	for	which	he	was	famous	–	engaging	his	interlocutors	in	philosophical	dialogue	–	was	explicitly	designed	to	‘persuade	young	and	old	to	make	their	first	and	chief	concern	not	for	their	bodies	or	their	wealth,	but	for	the	best	possible	condition	of	their	souls.’	6																																																									1	The	definitive	version	of	this	typescript	is	published	in	David	McPherson	(ed.),	Spirituality	and	the	
Good	Life:	Philosophical	Approaches	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2017),	Ch.	1.	2	ὁ	ἀνεξέταστος	βίος	οὐ	βιωτὸς	ἀνθρώπῳ	(ho	anexetastos	bios	ou	biōtos	anthrōpō);	Plato,	Apology	[c.	390	BC],	38a;	translations	from	Plato	are	my	own.	3	Thus	Michael	Dummett	went	so	far	as	to	declare	that	with	the	rise	of	the	modern	logical	and	analytic	style	of	philosophizing	‘the	proper	object	of	philosophy	[has	been]	finally	established,	namely	…	the	analysis	of	the	structure	of	thought,	[for	which]	the	only	proper	method	[is]	the	analysis	of	language.’	‘Can	Analytic	Philosophy	Be	Systematic?’	[1975],	in	Truth	and	Other	Enigmas	(London:	Duckworth,	1978),	p.	458.	4	Plato,	Apology,	40a2-c2.	5	Plato,	Apology,	29d5-e3;	cf.	30a6-b1;	31b;	36c.	6	Plato,	Apology,	30a.	For	more	on	this,	see	John	Cottingham,	‘Philosophy	and	Self-improvement:	Continuity	and	Change	in	Philosophy’s	Self-conception	from	the	Classical	to	the	Early-modern	Era,’	in	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 2	This	last	aspiration	evidently	takes	us	beyond	the	narrow	confines	of	philosophy	construed	as	a	specialised	academic	discipline	and	moves	us	out	into	the	general	territory	of	‘spirituality	and	the	good	life’	which	is	the	subject	of	the	present	volume.	In	thinking	about	spirituality	in	this	paper,	I	shall	aim	to	follow	the	Socratic	model	in	both	the	ways	indicated	above.	I	shall	begin	at	the	linguistic	or	conceptual	level,	by	looking	critically	at	what	is	meant	by	the	terms	‘spiritual’	and	‘spirituality’,	particularly	as	they	figure	in	our	contemporary	culture.	I	shall	then	move	on	to	ask	about	the	deeper	significance	for	human	life	of	that	cluster	of	experiences	and	practices	that	are	commonly	grouped	under	the	heading	of	the	spiritual.	By	the	end	of	the	paper	I	shall	hope	to	have	thrown	some	light	on	the	relationship	between	‘spiritual’	concerns	of	the	kind	that	Socrates	emphasises,	to	do	with	the	conduct	of	life	and	the	‘care	of	the	self’	(or	‘care	of	the	soul’),	7	and	on	the	other	hand	the	spiritual	concerns	that	have	typically	been	important	to	religious	believers	of	the	traditional	theistic	sort.	Can	one	be	spiritual	without	being	religious?	How	far	do	the	two	domains	overlap?	And	can	there	be	a	valid	form	of	spirituality	adapted	to	the	secularist	temper	of	our	times?	Can	one	preserve	what	is	important	about	the	Socratic	ideal	of	care	of	the	soul,	while	subtracting	the	traditional	theistic	framework	for	understanding	the	spiritual	domain	which	became	entrenched	in	Western	thought	with	the	rise	of	Christianity?			
2.	What	do	we	mean	by	‘spiritual’?	Let	us,	then,	start	our	‘examination’	at	the	linguistic	level.	A	brief	perusal	of	the	relevant	entry	in	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary	reveals	that	the	term	‘spiritual’	has	a	wide	variety	of	meanings	and	uses.	In	one	of	the	senses	listed	there,	it	has	a	distinctly	dualistic	flavour,	meaning	‘of	the	nature	of	a	spirit	…	incorporeal,	immaterial’;	and	under	this	heading	are	cited	Milton’s	lines,	‘millions	of	spiritual	Creatures	walk	the	Earth/	Unseen	…’	8	These	immaterialist	connotations,	present	in	the	root	noun	‘spirit’,	are	particularly	prominent	in	the	use	of	the	cognate	term	‘spiritualism’,	which	covers	activities	once	popular	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	but	now	largely	discredited,	such	as	attending	séances	and	attempting	to	communicate	with	the	ghosts	of	the	departed.	But	in	contemporary	usage,	the	terms	‘spiritual’	and	‘spirituality’	are,	or	can	be,	entirely	free	from	such	‘spooky’	connotations.	The	slogan	‘I'm	spiritual	but	I’m	not	religious’	has	become	a	cliché	of	our	time,	and	those	who	employ	it	normally	intend	to	dissociate	themselves	from	any	belief	in	supernatural	entities	(as	well	as	from	institutionalized	religion,	which	they	take	to	be	committed	to	such	entities,	or	to	be	objectionable	for	other	reasons).		
																																																																																																																																																																																							Michael	Chase,	Stephen	Clark	and	Michael	McGhee	(ed.),	Philosophy	as	a	Way	of	Life:	Ancients	and	
Moderns	(Oxford:	Blackwell	2013),	pp.	148-166.	7	For	more	on	the	notions	of	‘care	of	the	soul’	(epimeleia	tēs	psychēs)	and	‘care	of	the	self’	(epimeleia	
heautou)	in	ancient	philosophy,	see	the	magisterial	study	of	Pierre	Hadot,	Philosophy	as	a	Way	of	Life	(Oxford	Blackwell,	1955),	originally	published	as	Exercises	spirituels	et	philosophie	antique	[1987].	See	also	Michel	Foucault,	Seminar	at	the	Collège	de	France	of	6	January	1982,	published	as	‘Subjectivité	et	vérité’	[1962]	in	Cités,	ed.	Y.	C.	Zarka	(Vendôme:	Presses	Universitaires	de	France),	vol.	2	(March	2000),	pp.	143ff;	transl.	in	Foucault,	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2005),	pp.	1-19.	Foucault	shows	how	the	notion	of	self-examination	and	care	for	the	self	resonates	throughout	subsequent	Hellenistic	thought,	in	the	Epicurean	‘therapeutic’	conception	of	philosophy,	and	the	Stoic	notion	of	the	care	of	the	soul.	For	the	Epicureans,	see	A.	Long	and	D.	N.	Sedley	(eds),	The	
Hellenistic	Philosophers	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	l987),	25C;	for	the	Stoics,	see	for	example	Seneca,	Epistulae	morales	[AD	64],	x.	8	John	Milton,	Paradise	Lost	[1667],	iv,	677.	The	context	is	a	speech	in	which	Adam,	before	the	Fall,	speaks	to	Eve	of	how	he	is	aware	of	invisible	angelic	beings	all	around	him,	and	can	hear	their	‘celestial	voices	…	sole,	or	responsive	to	each	other’s	note,	singing	the	Great	Creator.’	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 3	In	this	vein,	Sam	Harris,	a	prominent	spokesman	for	the	‘new	atheism’,	has	insisted	that	acknowledging	the	existence	and	value	of	the	spiritual	is	quite	consistent	with	the	uncompromisingly	empiricist/naturalistic	worldview	that	he	champions:	‘spiritual	experiences	often	constitute	the	most	important	and	transformative	moments	in	a	person’s	life.	Not	recognizing	that	such	experiences	are	possible	or	important	can	make	us	appear	less	wise	even	than	our	craziest	religious	opponents.’	9	In	the	following	two	sections	we	shall	look	more	closely	at	the	nature	and	significance	of	the	spiritual,	including	the	‘important’	and	‘transformative’	moments	in	life	which	Harris	here	admits	and	acknowledges.	But	keeping	for	the	moment	to	the	question	of	current	linguistic	usage,	it	seems	clear	that	secularists	such	as	Harris	are	not	violating	any	rules	of	language	in	acknowledging	the	importance	of	spirituality	while	repudiating	the	theistic	worldview	and	dissociating	themselves	from	the	beliefs	and	practices	of	institutionalized	religion.	Consider	for	example	the	two	main	components	of	spirituality,	as	the	term	is	normally	understood	today,	which	I	take	to	be	spiritual	praxis,	and	spiritual	experience.	As	far	as	the	first	is	concerned,	praying	to	God,	and	other	performances	and	activities	that	involve	or	presuppose	the	existence	of	a	personal	deity	(or	deities),	evidently	do	not	exhaust	the	class	of	spiritual	practices.	One	thinks	here	of	the	spiritual	techniques	of	fasting,	meditation	and	chanting	in	the	Theravada	Buddhist	tradition,	where	there	is	no	belief	in	a	personal	God.	What	is	more,	we	can	find	a	host	of	techniques	and	practices	on	offer	in	our	contemporary	culture,	concerned	for	example	with	goals	such	as	mindfulness,	self-awareness,	and	inner	tranquillity,	10	which	are	widely	regarded	as	having	a	‘spiritual’	aspect,	without	any	suggestion	that	they	are	necessarily	connected	with	a	religion.			 As	far	as	concerns	our	second	main	component	of	spirituality,	namely	experience,	it	again	appears	that	contemporary	usage	allows	that	an	experience	can	count	as	spiritual	without	any	suggestion	that	the	content	of	the	experience	has	to	be	interpreted	in	terms	of	some	religious	doctrine	or	doctrines.	The	kinds	of	experience	cited	by	Harris	in	his	defence	of	atheist	spirituality	involve	feelings	of	‘selfless	wellbeing’,	‘self-transcendence’,	and	‘boundless	love’,	11	and	he	maintains	that	‘to	seek	to	live	a	spiritual	life	without	deluding	ourselves,	we	must	view	these	experiences	in	universal	and	secular	terms’.12	This	latter	remark,	however,	raises	the	stakes,	since	it	evidently	goes	far	beyond	the	mere	claim	that	one	can	have	spiritual	experience	without	being	religious;	it	is	phrased	in	such	a	way	as	to	imply	that	religious	accounts	of	spiritual	experience	are	seriously	mistaken,	and	that	Harris’s	own	preferred	secular	account	is	grounded	in	enlightened	(‘universal	and	secular’)	principles	that	should	be	acceptable	to	any	rational	inquirer.	Yet	from	the	fact	that	English	usage	allows	certain	experiences	to	be	identified	(by	Harris	and	many	others)	under	the	description	‘spiritual	and	not	religious’,	it	does	not	automatically	follow	that	they	can	be	fully	and	adequately	understood	without	any	reference	to	religious	categories	of	thought.	To	give	an	analogy:	from	the	fact	that	certain	phenomena	are	identified	by	many	people	as	‘mental	and	not	physical’,	it	does	not	follow	that	they	can	be	fully	and	adequately	understood	without	any	reference	to																																																									9	Sam	Harris,	Waking	Up:	A	Guide	to	Spirituality	Without	Religion	(New	York:	Simon	and	Schuster,	2014).	How	far	religious	believers	do	actually	subscribe	to	the	radically	dualistic	ontology	that	Harris	implicitly	attributes	to	them	is	a	question	for	another	paper.	10	Compare	for	example	a	recent	five-week	clinical	project	that	‘used	combined	Tai	Chi	and	mindfulness-based	stress	reduction’	as	an	educational	program.	According	to	the	study,	‘statements	the	boys	and	girls	made	in	the	process	suggested	that	they	experienced	well-being,	calmness,	relaxation,	improved	sleep,	less	reactivity,	increased	self-care,	self-awareness,	and	a	sense	of	interconnection	or	interdependence	with	nature.’	R.	B.	Wall,	‘Tai	Chi	and	mindfulness-based	stress	reduction	in	a	Boston	Public	Middle	School’,	Journal	of	Paediatric	Healthcare	Vol.	19,	4	(2005),	pp.	230-7,	opening	abstract.	11	Harris,	Waking	Up,	pp.	5,	14,	17,	18,	43.	12	Harris,	Waking	Up,	p.	203.	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 4	physical	phenomena	(if	that	followed,	we	would	have	an	altogether	too	easy	argument	for	mind-body	dualism!).13	Whether	a	fully	adequate	account	of	spiritual	experience	can	indeed	be	supplied	within	a	secularist	framework	is	a	question	that	remains	to	be	decided.	A	second	but	related	caveat	that	needs	to	be	entered	here	is	that	linguistic	labels,	even	when	sanctioned	by	ordinary	usage,	can	often	conceal	questionable	metaphysical	presuppositions.	Harris,	like	many	militant	atheists,	wears	the	mantle	of	the	impartial	and	empirically	oriented	scientist.	Thus,	in	his	book	Waking	Up,	subtitled	A	Guide	to	Spirituality	
without	Religion,	he	tells	his	readers	that	‘nothing	in	this	book	needs	to	be	accepted	on	faith’,	since	all	the	assertions	‘can	be	tested	in	the	laboratory	of	your	own	life.’14	But	the	spurious	image	of	the	laboratory	masks	a	vision	of	ultimate	reality	that	is	actually	metaphysical,	not	scientific.	Harris’s	spiritual	experiences,	he	claims,	disclose	a	reality	where	there	are	no	true	substances	and	there	is	ultimately	nothing	but	an	impersonal	flux	of	conditions	that	arise	and	pass	away,	and	‘the	conventional	self	is	a	transitory	experience	among	transitory	experiences’.15	Yet	if	the	results	of	his	reported	spiritual	experience	are	supposed	to	count	as	empirical	confirmation	of	this	impersonalist	vision	of	reality,	then	Harris	has	left	himself	no	justification	for	dismissing	as	‘crazy’	those	countless	theists	whose	own	spiritual	experience	has,	by	contrast,	seemed	to	them	to	disclose	the	nature	of	reality	as	deeply	and	ultimately	personal.	Talk	of	the	‘laboratory’	of	experience	is	not	going	to	help	very	much	here,	since	clearly	everything	is	going	to	depend	not	on	measurement	of	‘data’	or	other	such	scientific	procedures,	but	on	the	character	of	the	experiences	in	question	and	how	they	are	interpreted.	The	upshot	of	all	this	is	that	whatever	contemporary	usage	may	or	may	not	sanction	regarding	the	current	employment	of	the	term	‘spiritual’,	all	the	interesting	questions	about	the	significance	of	the	term,	and	whether	it	can	be	fully	and	coherently	detached	from	the	religious	domain,	are	not	going	to	be	decidable	on	linguistic	grounds	alone;	for	they	are	inextricably	bound	up	with	the	stance	we	take	on	more	substantive	issues	about	the	meaning	of	the	spiritual	and	the	role	it	plays	in	our	lives.	To	these	more	substantive	questions	we	shall	now	turn.			
3.	Spirituality	and	the	cosmos	In	many	powerful	accounts	of	spiritual	experience	in	literature,	two	elements	that	are	strikingly	prominent	are,	first,	that	such	experience	has	a	profoundly	human	dimension,	being	connected	with	our	deepest	human	responses	and	aspirations,	and,	second,	that	such	experience	has	what	might	be	called	a	cosmic	dimension,	being	somehow	concerned	with	the	ultimate	nature	of	reality	as	a	whole,	and	our	relationship	to	it.	Few	writers	have	produced	more	eloquent	reflections	on	the	character	of	spiritual	experience	than	George	Eliot,	as	in	the	following	passage	from	her	first	novel,	Adam	Bede:		 Our	caresses,	our	tender	words,	our	still	rapture	under	the	influence	of	Autumn	sunsets,	or	pillared	vistas,	or	calm	majestic	statues,	or	Beethoven	symphonies,	all	bring	with	them	the	consciousness	that	they	are	mere	waves	and	ripples	in	an	unfathomable	ocean	of	love	and	beauty;	our	emotion	in	its	keenest	moment	passes	from	expression	into	silence,	our	love	at	its	highest	flood	rushes	beyond	its	object	and	loses	itself	in	the	sense	of	divine	mystery.16																																																										13	Compare	Antoine	Arnauld’s	criticisms	of	Descartes’s	arguments	in	the	Fourth	Set	of	Objections	to	the	Meditations	[1641].	14	Harris,	Waking	Up,	p.	7.	15	Harris,	Waking	Up,	p.	206.	16	George	Eliot,	Adam	Bede	[1859],	Bk	I,	Ch.	3.	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 5	The	passage	identifies	some	very	typical	and	characteristic	examples	falling	under	the	genre	of	spiritual	experience	as	commonly	understood:	passionate	reactions	to	the	beauties	of	the	natural	world	(‘rapture’	at	‘Autumn	sunsets’);	powerful	responses	to	great	works	of	art	(‘majestic	statues’,	‘Beethoven	symphonies’);	and	the	interactions,	laden	with	deep	significance,	that	arise	between	people	who	are	in	close	personal	relationships	(‘caresses’,	‘tender	words’).	Although	all	three	types	of	phenomenon	are	far	from	mundane	–	their	heightened	importance	signals	that	they	raise	us	above	the	humdrum	world	of	daily	routine	and	toil	–	they	are	all	nevertheless	a	precious	part	of	our	human	birthright,	indispensible	elements	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	fully	flourishing	human	being,	and	something	without	which	our	species	would	be	immeasurably	poorer.		But	alongside	(but	by	no	means	unrelated	to)	this	very	human	dimension,	there	is	also,	as	skilfully	emphasised	by	Eliot,	something	more.	In	having	an	experience	that	falls	under	one	of	the	categories	she	describes,	we	are	made	dimly	aware	that	what	is	happening	to	us	somehow	enables	us	to	participate	in	something	momentous	–	something	that	is	more	than	a	mere	subjective	psychological	episode,	and	which	connects	us	with	an	objective	framework	of	meaning	and	value	that	is	not	of	our	own	making.	Language	tends	to	falter	here,	since	by	its	very	nature	this	‘cosmic’	dimension	(as	I	am	calling	it	for	want	of	a	better	term)	transcends	the	domain	to	which	our	ordinary	everyday	language	is	fitted,	adapted	as	it	is	to	help	us	survive	and	cope	with	the	immediate	demands	of	the	world	around	us.	But	as	Eliot	puts	it,	grappling	with	symbolic	and	metaphorical	expressions	in	order	to	reach	at	what	she	wants	to	convey,	there	is	a	sense	that	these	powerful	and	rapturous	spiritual	responses	connect	us	with	something	greater	–	that	they	are	‘are	mere	waves	and	ripples	in	an	unfathomable	ocean	of	love	and	beauty.’		Note	that	Eliot	herself	is	not	being	explicitly	religious	here	–	at	least	not	in	the	sense	that	she	is	defending	the	truth	of	any	specific	religious	dogma.	Nor	indeed	was	she	herself	religious	in	the	conventional	institutional	sense,	having	a	number	of	serious	doubts	about	the	metaphysical	doctrines	of	Christianity.	Influenced	by	David	Strauss	and	Ludwig	Feuerbach	(both	of	whom	she	translated),17	she	inclined	if	anything	towards	an	agnostic	and	humanistic	stance,	which	valued	Christianity	more	for	its	moral	teachings	than	for	its	theological	dogmas.	Elsewhere	in	Adam	Bede,	the	eponymous	protagonist	comes	close	to	voicing	what	may	well	have	been	Eliot’s	own	view	of	the	matter	when	he	says	‘I’ve	seen	pretty	clear	ever	since	I	was	a	young	un,	as	religion’s	something	else	besides	doctrines	and	notions.’18	The	thought	here	is	that	the	moral	and	practical	components	of	Christianity	–	right	conduct,	and	loving	and	generous	emotions	–	are	what	count,	rather	than	the	theological	ideas	and	theories	embodied	in	this	or	that	creed	or	catechism.	Yet	although	Eliot,	in	common	with	many	nineteenth-century	thinkers,	was	evidently	attracted	by	what	can	broadly	be	called	a	humanistic	interpretation	of	Christianity,	19	it	is	clear	from	the	passage	quoted	at	the	start	of	this	section	that	her	vision	of	the	content	of	spiritual	experience	cannot	be	understood	merely	in	terms	of	human	moral	aspirations.	The	‘unfathomable	ocean	of	beauty	and	love’	of	which	the	passage	speaks,	let	alone	the	talk	of	‘divine	mystery’,	implies	that	our	human	activities	and	emotions	are	not	the	entire	story	–	they	are	but	‘waves	and	ripples’,	as	Eliot	puts	it,	in	a	greater	whole.	So	it	is	not	just	that																																																									17	The	German	liberal	Protestant	theologian	David	Strauss’s	Life	of	Jesus	[Das	Leben	Jesu,	1836]	created	a	stir	at	the	time	by	treating	the	Gospel	writings	from	a	purely	‘historical’	perspective,	denying	that	the	miracles,	for	example,	were	actual	occurrences,	and	interpreting	them	purely	on	a	mythical	level.	Eliot’s	English	translation	was	published	in	1846.	More	radically	still,	Ludwig	Feuerbach’s	Essence	of	
Christianity	[Das	Wesen	des	Christentums,	1841]	interpreted	the	idea	of	God	as	a	projection	or	externalization	of	man’s	moral	nature;	Eliot’s	English	version	appeared	in	1854.	18	Eliot,	Adam	Bede,	Ch.	17.	19	Perhaps	the	most	famous	example	is	Leo	Tolstoy;	see	for	example	his	What	I	Believe	[V	chyom	moya	
vera?,	1885].	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 6	experiencing	the	beauties	of	nature	or	art	or	of	close	personal	affection	is	very	important	and	valuable	in	our	lives	(though	that	of	course	is	true);	more	than	that,	such	experience	draws	us	forward	and	beyond	ourselves,	Eliot	seems	to	be	saying,	and	enables	us	somehow	to	be	part	of,	or	at	one	with,	something	mysterious	which	cannot	be	properly	grasped	or	named,	but	which	we	sense	as	the	unfathomable	source	from	which	there	flows	all	that	is	good	and	meaningful	in	human	life.	If	this	is	what	spiritual	experience,	at	its	deepest	is	(and	I	submit	that	most	readers	who	honestly	interrogate	themselves	will	find	that	phenomenologically	Eliot’s	description	rings	true,	at	least	to	some	degree),	then	something	like	a	‘cosmic’	dimension	in	our	most	profound	spiritual	experiences	seems	hard	to	deny.	And	then	it	begins	to	seem	as	if	the	whole	project	of	secularizing,	or	‘humanizing’	or	‘demythologizing’	spirituality,	and	hence	the	whole	project	of	insisting	that	one	can	be	‘spiritual	without	being	religious’,	may	turn	out	to	be	more	problematic	than	at	first	appeared.	To	be	sure,	the	terms	‘religion’	and	‘religious’	are	broad	ones,	which	defy	simple	definition,20	and	as	we	have	already	seen,	there	are	recognized	spiritual	practices	that	do	not	presuppose	religious	belief	in	the	sense	of	allegiance	to	a	theistic	worldview.	And	certainly	it	would	be	absurd	to	suggest	that	spiritual	experience	is	available	only	to	those	who	are	explicit	‘believers’,	as	that	term	is	normally	understood	in	for	example	the	Abrahamic	religions.	But	even	when	all	that	is	granted,	the	task	of	philosophical	‘examination’	still	requires	us	to	reflect	seriously	about	the	character	and	content	of	the	deep	spiritual	experiences	under	discussion.	What	exactly	is	the	‘cosmic’	dimension	that	seems	irresistibly	to	manifests	itself	to	the	experiencing	subject?	Is	it	just	a	vague	sense	the	subject	has	that	he	or	she	is	part	of	a	wider	process?	Or	is	there	(as	is	suggested	by	Eliot’s	talk	of	an	unfathomable	source	of	love	and	beauty),	an	inescapable	moral	dimension,	something	like	an	awareness	of,	or	a	confrontation	with,	an	‘enduring	power,	not	ourselves,	which	makes	for	righteousness’,	in	Matthew	Arnold’s	solemn	phrase.21	For	if	the	latter	is	the	case	(and	we	shall	be	exploring	this	in	more	detail	in	the	following	section),	it	may	begin	to	look	after	all	as	if	the	experiences	in	question	are	comfortably	locatable	only	within	something	very	like	a	theistic	worldview.		It	is	of	course	true	that	the	account	of	spiritual	feelings	found	in	Adam	Bede	comes	from	an	author	who	was	brought	up	in,	and	surrounded	by,	a	strongly	entrenched	theistic	culture.	So	today’s	anti-religious	sceptic	might	argue	that,	in	spite	of	her	better	rational	self,	Eliot’s	language	inevitably	bears	the	traces	of	the	traditional	religious	outlook	of	her	time;	and	further,	that	the	modern	advocate	of	‘spirituality	without	religion’	should	be	able,	in	our	more	fully	enlightened	and	secularized	milieu,	to	provide	an	account	of	the	spiritual	which	dispenses	with	the	theistic	backdrop	entirely.	This	is	certainly	the	aim	of	Sam	Harris,	who	tells	us	he	wants	to	salvage	the	‘important	psychological	truths’	from	the	‘rubble’,	or	to	‘pluck	the	diamond	from	the	dunghill	of	esoteric	religion’.22	It’s	remarkable,	however,	that	despite	these	official	aspirations	to	purge	away	all	the	religious	elements,	what	we	actually	find	in	the	descriptions	which	Harris	and	others	who	think	like	him	give	of	their	spiritual	experience	is	language	with	a	‘cosmic’	flavour	very	similar	to	that	which	we	find	in	Eliot.	As	already	noted,	Harris	talks	of	‘boundless	love’,	and	a	sense	of	‘being	at	one	with	the	cosmos’.	And	in	similar	vein,	his	fellow	atheist	Christopher	Hitchens	spoke	towards	the	end	of	his	life	of	deep	experiences	of	the	beauties	of	great	music,	or	art,	or	the	natural	world,	as	giving	him	a	sense	of	‘what	you	could	call	the	Numinous,	the																																																									20	There	is	a	large	literature	on	the	vexed	question	of	how	to	define	the	term	‘religion’,	which	it	would	take	far	more	space	than	is	available	to	attempt	to	summarize	here.	A	valuable	starting	point	for	discussion	is	Emile	Durkheim’s	account	in	The	Elementary	Forms	of	Religious	Life	[Les	formes	
élémentaires	de	la	vie	religieuse,	1912],	trans.	C.	Cosman	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001),	Ch.	1.	21	Matthew	Arnold,	Literature	and	Dogma	[1873],	Ch.	1.	22	Harris,	Waking	Up,	pp.	5	and	10.	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 7	Transcendent	…	’23	But	here	we	have	a	curious	paradox.	From	the	official	standpoint	of	the	hard-nosed	materialist-atheist,	to	describe	such	experiences	as	‘transcendent’,	or	‘numinous’,	or	as	connecting	them	with	an	ocean	of	‘boundless	love’	must	necessarily	be	simply	a	façon	de	
parler	–	a	way	of	talking	that	lacks	any	ontological	basis,	or	which	does	not	point	to	any	ultimate	objective	reality.	For	their	officially	held	view	maintains	that	the	natural	world	studied	by	science	is,	ontologically	speaking,	all	that	there	really	is;	and	though	there	may	be	heightened	or	altered	states	of	consciousness,	like	those	Sam	Harris	has	expressed	an	interest	in	studying	(produced,	he	says,	by	fasting,	meditation	and	‘psychotropic	plants’),24	these	are	understood	as	purely	subjective	effects	of	various	brain	changes,	arising	as	by-products	of	evolved	physiological	processes	originally	generated	by	the	needs	of	survival	in	the	ordinary	natural	world.	The	idea	of	anything	more	to	the	story	than	this,	anything	ontologically	extra	that	transcends	the	material	world,	is	for	Harris	and	those	who	think	like	him,	simply	an	illusion,	resulting	from	the	fact	that	we	humans	are	‘deeply	disposed	to	broadcast	our	own	subjectivity	onto	the	world’25	(an	idea	derived	from	one	of	the	founding	fathers	of	modern	atheism,	David	Hume,	when	he	observed	that	‘the	mind	has	a	great	propensity	to	spread	itself	on	external	objects’26).27		But	what	in	the	scientific	worldview	that	such	atheists	so	prize	could	possibly	licence	the	idea	that	the	jangling	of	particle	interactions,	unfolding	impersonally	without	purpose	or	any	intrinsic	significance	whatsoever,	could	constitute	an	ocean	of	love	and	beauty;	or	what	could	justify	the	notion	of	a	deep	harmony,	between	myself	and	these	supposedly	blank,	impersonal	and	purposeless	phenomena,	so	that	I	am	able	to	feel	myself	‘at	one	with	the	cosmos’?	To	be	fair	to	Harris’s	position,	he	does	in	his	more	cautious	moments	pull	back	from	any	implied	commitment	to	what	I	have	called	the	‘cosmic’	dimension	of	spiritual	experience.	Feeling	at	one	with	the	cosmos,	he	observes	at	one	point,	‘says	a	lot	about	the	possibilities	of	human	consciousness,	but	it	says	nothing	about	the	universe	at	large	…	nor	does	it	suggest	that	the	“energy”	of	love	somehow	pervades	the	cosmos.’	All	that	such	feelings	do,	he	goes	on	to	say,	is	‘tell	us	a	lot	about	the	human	mind’:	they	tell	us	that	such	experiences	do	as	a	matter	of	fact	occur	if	you	adopt	the	right	techniques	(Buddhist-style	metta	meditation,	for	instance),	or	‘taking	the	right	drug’.28	Yet	this	kind	of	strategy,	reducing	spiritual	experience	to	a	mere	subjective	psychological	state,	has	an	enormous	cost.	It	robs	such	experience	of	any	significance	beyond	that	of	some	kind	of	private	‘trip’,	which	may	make	me	‘feel	good’,	but	does	not	disclose	anything	important	about	the	way	things	are.	Harris	himself,	as	we	have	seen,	speaks	of	spiritual	experiences	as	among	the	most	‘important	and	transformative’	experiences	humans	can	have.	But	if	I	simply	take	a	pill	that	makes	everything	look	green	for	twenty-four	hours,	even	though	such	experience	may,	if	replicated	with	many	different	subjects,	be	‘scientifically	well	attested’,	there	is	no	reason	whatever	to	suppose	that	it	is	important	or	transformative	in	any	interesting	way	–	even	if	it	makes	me	say	‘Wow!’	and	go	round	for	a	time	with	a	euphoric	smile	on	my	face.	Even	if	the	experience	is	one	of	undifferentiated	benevolence	or	love,	or	
																																																								23	Christopher	Hitchens,	in	debate	with	Tony	Blair	[2010],	quoted	in	Jules	Evans,	‘The	New	Atheists	are	actually	transcendentalists’,	http://philosophyforlife.org/the-new-atheists-are-actually-
transcendentalists/,	posted	24	January	2014.	24	Sam	Harris,	The	End	of	Faith	(New	York:	Norton,	2005),	Ch.	7,	p.	210.	25	Sam	Harris,	‘The	Mortal	Dangers	of	Religious	Faith’,	interview	at	http://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?docId=542154	26	David	Hume,	A	Treatise	of	Human	Nature	[1739-40],	Book	I,	Part	3,	section	xiv..	27	The	foregoing	paragraph	draws	partly	on	material	from	my	How	to	Believe	(London:	Bloomsbury,	2015),	Ch.	2	28	Harris,	Waking	Up,	pp.	43-4.	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 8	some	other	‘oceanic’	feeling,	29	it	is	not	going	to	be	transformative	in	any	interesting	way	(as	those	who	witnessed	or	participated	in	the	short-lived	vacuities	of	the	‘psychedelic’	and	‘hippy’	movements	of	the	1970s	will	be	able	to	confirm),	unless	it	is	more	than	an	interior	episode.	An	psychological	event	or	brain	change	might	of	course	have	great	significance	if	it	discloses	something	about	what	is	going	on	outside	me	(if	it	is	involved	in	my	appreciating	a	great	piece	of	music,	or	conversing	with	a	loved	one,	for	example);	but	then	it	is	ex	hypothesi	more	than	just	an	interior	change.		Authentic	spiritual	experience	is	not	merely	a	psychological	episode	but	is	inextricably	bound	up	with	a	certain	kind	of	spiritual	transformation;	and	if	we	start	to	unpack	the	phenomenology	of	the	change	we	quickly	see	that	it	has	a	distinctively	moral	character,	in	the	broad	sense	of	that	term.	I	have	a	sense	of	being	confronted	with	something	beyond	myself	that	I	perceive	to	be	good,	or	worthy	of	my	admiration	or	love	or	respect,	and	as	demanding	a	response	from	me	whether	I	like	it	or	not.	To	this	vital	moral	dimension	of	spiritual	experience	we	must	now	turn.			
4.	The	moral	dimension	Part	of	the	problem	in	understanding	what	is	meant	by	spirituality	is	that	in	our	fragmented	and	compartmentalized	modern	culture	we	tend	to	split	the	flow	of	our	human	existence	into	separate	compartments.	There	is	our	‘job’	versus	our	‘free	time’	–	but	where	do	philosophizing,	or	talking	with	a	partner,	or	playing	with	one’s	children	fit	into	that	dichotomy?	There	are	our	‘moral’	sensibilities	versus	our	‘aesthetic’	sensibilities,	but	to	which	set	of	capacities	does	a	great	literary	work	like	Tolstoy’s	War	and	Peace	or	Jane	Austin’s	
Persuasion	appeal?	Or	again,	there	is	the	‘moral’	domain	versus	the	domain	of	‘the	natural	world’,	but	(as	I	have	argued	in	other	writings)	it	is	impossible	to	read	the	‘nature’	poetry	of	William	Wordsworth	properly	without	becoming	aware	that	the	poet’s	reflections	are	inextricable	fusions	of	the	moral	and	the	aesthetic:	his	exaltation	and	joy	at	the	beauty	of	the	woods	and	fields	is	closely	bound	up	with	a	deep	sense	of	their	goodness	and	of	the	‘blessing’	that	they	bestow,	a	sense	in	turn	linked	to	the	upwelling	in	him	of	love	and	sympathy	for	humankind.30	If	we	turn	to	the	‘praxis’	component	of	spiritualty	–	the	performances,	disciplines	and	routines	which	have	traditionally	been	part	of	a	spiritual	way	of	life	–	we	can	find	this	same	comprehensiveness	or	inclusiveness	as	regards	the	faculties	and	capacities	involved,	and	the	same	moral	thread	running	through	them	all.	Ignatius	of	Loyola	was	famous	for	his	‘spiritual	exercises’	designed	to	be	undertaken	systematically	during	the	course	of	a	retreat	lasting	many	days.31	Such	exercises,	or	similar	ones	still	widely	practised	today	in	Ignatian	and	other	forms	of	spirituality,	include	prayer,	fasting,	meditation,	lectio	divina	(the	attentive	reading	of	Scripture),	participating	in	communal	worship,	group	activities	such	as	singing	psalms,	individual	self-examination	and	confession,	and	moments	of	prayer	or	reflective	silence	at	key	moments	of	the	day	(for	example	before	eating,	or	before	retiring).																																																									29	For	this	term,	see	André	Comte-Sponville,	The	Book	of	Atheist	Spirituality	[originally	published	as	
L’esprit	de	l’athéisme,	2006]	(London:	Bantam,	2008),	pp.	150ff.	The	term	was	discussed	much	earlier	by	Sigmund	Freud	in	Civilization	and	its	discontents	[Das	Unbehagen	in	der	Kultur,	1929],	§1;	transl.	in	
The	Penguin	Freud	Library	(London:	Penguin	Books,	1985),	Vol.	12.	30	See	John	Cottingham,	‘Human	Nature	and	the	Transcendent’,	in	Constantine	Sandis	and	M.	J.	Cain	(ed.),	Human	Nature.	Royal	Institute	of	Philosophy	supplement	70	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012),	pp.	233-254,	where	I	discuss	key	passages	from	Wordsworth’s	The	Prelude.	31	Ignatius	of	Loyola,	Spiritual	Exercises	[Ejercicios	espirituales,	c.	1525],	trans.	J.	Munitz	and	P.	Endean	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin,	1996).	Ignatius’s	original	Spanish	text	was	first	published	posthumously	in	1615,	but	a	Latin	translation	(Exercitia	Spiritualia)	was	published	in	Rome,	with	papal	approval,	in	1548.	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 9	Spiritual	exercises	are	typically	multivalent	–	they	work	on	many	different	levels,	including	the	emotional,	the	physical,	the	aesthetic	and	the	moral;	and	it	is	important	to	add	that	they	operate	in	ways	that	are	not	always	directly	accessible	to	the	conscious	reflective	mind.	A	paradigm	case	of	a	spiritual	practice,	familiar	from	the	Benedictine	and	other	monastic	traditions,	is	the	singing	of	Psalms.	This	originally	involved	learning	the	complete	set	by	heart	and	reinforcing	the	memory	through	regular	repetition,	day	by	day	and	month	by	month.	But	the	recitation	is	no	mere	intellectual	exercise,	but	an	embodied	ritual,	involving	physical	movements	of	standing	and	sitting	and	bowing,	the	taking	up	of	each	verse	antiphonally,	by	alternating	sides	of	the	choir,	and	of	course	the	music,	the	plainsong	chant,	which	not	only	requires	careful	breathing	and	close	attention	to	the	rhythm	of	the	words,	but	a	constant	listening	by	each	singer,	to	match	his	intonation	to	that	of	his	neighbours.	32	One	reason	that	music	is	so	important	here	is	that	its	effects	on	us,	both	as	listeners	and	as	participants,	engage	the	whole	person,	physically,	emotionally,	intellectually,	and	also	in	deeper,	more	diffusive	ways,	operating	below	the	threshold	of	consciousness,	which	we	scarcely	understand.	Music	at	its	best	(and	the	same	goes	for	the	finest	literature	and	visual	art)	have	this	ineffable	quality	–	they	speak	to	something	deep	within	us,	yet	at	the	same	time	somehow	take	us	outside	ourselves	to	a	more	exalted	plane.	Such	music	is,	as	T.	S.	Eliot	put	it	in	one	of	his	most	religiously	sensitive	poems:		 music	heard	so	deeply	That	it	is	not	heard	at	all,	but	you	are	the	music		While	the	music	lasts.	These	are	only	hints	and	guesses,		Hints	followed	by	guesses;	and	the	rest		Is	prayer,	observance,	discipline,	thought	and	action.33		 The	ability	of	great	art	to	generate	‘self-transcendence’	is	something	that	many	secularists	are	happy	to	acknowledge;	indeed	some	have	suggested	that	all	we	need	of	a	‘spiritual’	kind	can	be	supplied	by	music,	art	or	literature,	thus	making	religion	redundant.	Salmon	Rushdie	has	argued	that	literature	can	and	ought	to	fill	this	role,	and	aim	to	capture	what	he	calls	‘the	soaring	quality	of	transcendence’:		It	is	for	art	to	capture	that	experience,	to	offer	it	to,	in	the	case	of	literature,	its	readers;	to	be,	for	a	secular,	materialist	culture,	some	sort	of	replacement	for	what	the	love	of	god	offers	in	the	world	of	faith.34		But	one	problem	with	this	kind	of	position	is	that	the	implied	exclusive	dichotomy	between	the	domain	of	religion	on	the	one	hand	and	the	domain	of	art	on	the	other	is	in	many	respects	misleading.	For	clearly	some	of	the	greatest	visual	art	and	literature	and	music	in	our	culture	is	inherently	religious.	Those	who	juxtapose	art	and	religion	as	opposites	may	well	have	in	mind	a	very	one-sided	image	of	religion	as	what	is	purveyed	by	fundamentalists	who																																																									32	Further	discussion	the	multivalent	aspects	of	psalm	singing	and	other	spiritual	practices	may	be	found	in	John	Cottingham,	‘Theism	and	Spirituality’	in	C.	Taliaferro,	V.	Harrison,	and	S.	Goetz	(eds),	The	
Routledge	Companion	to	Theism	(New	York:	Routledge,	2013),	Ch	50,	pp.	654-665.	33	T.	S.	Eliot,	‘The	Dry	Salvages’	[1941],	subsequently	incorporated	into	Four	Quartets	[1943].	I	am	grateful	to	Jay	Parini	for	his	comments	on	this	passage	in	a	talk	on	‘Eliot’s	Four	Quartets	as	a	Pattern	for	Christian	Living’,	given	at	Heythrop	College,	London	in	May	2016.	34	Salmon	Rushdie,	‘Is	Nothing	Sacred?’,	in	Imaginary	Homelands:	Essays	and	Criticism	1981-1991	(London:	Granta,	1991),	p.	425-6.	Cited	in	Rebecca	Stott,	‘The	Wetfooted	Understory:	Darwinian	Immersions’,	in	G.	Levine	(ed.),	The	Joy	of	Secularism	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2011),	p.	206.	For	a	similar	argument	that	art	can	and	should	be	a	replacement	for	religion,	see	Alain	de	Botton	and	John	Armstrong,	Art	as	Therapy	(London:	Phaidon,	2013).		
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 10	subscribe	to	rigid	dogmas	and	literalist	interpretations	of	the	Bible.	Such	fundamentalist	approaches	are,	of	course,	to	be	found;	but	elsewhere,	for	example	in	the	great	liturgical	heritage	of	Catholic	and	Anglican	and	Orthodox	Christianity,	one	can	find	forms	of	spirituality	that	are	inextricably	intertwined	with	some	of	the	most	resonant	and	‘soaring’	literature	and	art	and	music	that	humanity	has	ever	produced.	An	even	more	important	aspect	of	religious	spirituality,	which	provides	a	further	reason	to	suppose	there	is	something	suspect	about	the	project	of	replacing	it	with	art,	is	that	it	has	an	overwhelmingly	moral	purpose.	Art	of	a	secular	kind	is	answerable	to	all	sorts	of	standards,	some	detached	from	any	moral	concerns	whatsoever;	but	the	overriding	aim	of	authentic	spiritual	praxis	is	to	facilitate	the	emergence	of	a	better	self,	purged	of	wasteful	and	destructive	and	self-absorbed	inclinations	and	desires,	and	able	to	begin	the	task	of	growing,	no	doubt	slowly	and	painfully,	into	the	self	one	was	meant	to	be	–	in	short	to	embark	on	the	traditional	Benedictine	task	of	self-transformation,	or	‘conversion	of	life’.35	We	are	back	with	the	Socratic	idea	of	‘care	of	the	soul’.		 Moving	our	attention	from	spiritual	praxis	to	the	other	component	of	spirituality	we	have	been	focusing	on,	namely	spiritual	experience,	we	find	that	the	pervasive	moral	dimension	is	even	more	apparent.	An	experience	that	was	merely	diverting	or	titillating,	or	shocking	or	entertaining	or	enjoyable,	or	even	just	very	emotionally	moving,	could	not	count	as	a	spiritual	experience;	there	has	to	be	something	deeper,	more	resonant	and	more	meaningful	for	the	life	of	the	subject	and	his	or	her	moral	development.		 Such	experience	takes	a	specifically	theistic	form	in	many	remarkable	passages	in	the	Hebrew	Bible,	as	in	one	of	the	Psalms	where	the	speaker	is	overwhelmed	by	a	sense	of	divine	power.	God	is	described	as	the	one	who	‘breaks	the	cedars	of	Lebanon	and	makes	Lebanon	skip	like	a	calf’,	who	‘shakes	the	wilderness	and	strips	the	forests	bare,	while	all	in	the	temple	cry	“Glory”’.36	The	cry	of	‘Glory’	(in	Hebrew	kavod	דוֹבָכּ)	signifies	something	weighty	with	significance,	sacred,	mysterious,	a	manifestation	of	the	divine,	as	conveyed	in	the	description	of	the	pillar	of	fire	and	cloud	which	led	the	Israelites	out	of	Egypt,	or	the	cloud	atop	Mount	Sinai	where	God’s	law	was	manifest	to	Moses.37	We	are	not	talking	of	‘natural	beauty’	in	the	attenuated	modern	sense,	but	of	something	fearful	that	calls	forth	reverence	and	awe,	like	the	burning	bush,	flaming	but	never	consumed,	where	Moses	was	told	to	keep	his	distance.38	These	are	not	‘impressive	sights’,	of	the	kind	familiar	from	television	nature	programmes,	but	events	pregnant	with	moral	significance,	as	is	clear	from	the	lines	from	an	earlier	Psalm,	where	the	forests	are	said	to	‘sing	for	joy’	because	the	world	is	to	be	judged.39	In	psychological	or	phenomenological	terms,	what	is	happening	here	is	an	experience	where	the	subject	is	overwhelmed	by	the	power	and	beauty	of	nature	in	a	way	that	is	somehow	intertwined	with	awareness	of	one’s	own	weakness	and	imperfection,	and	a	sense	of	confrontation	with	the	inexorable	demands	of	justice	and	righteousness.	In	short,	the	spiritual	experience	in	question	involves	the	kind	of	awareness	which	enables	one	to	see	the	world	transfigured,	so	that	it	is	irradiated	with	meaning	and	value,	and	the	human	subject,	caught	up	in	that	mystery,	is	unmistakeably	called	on	to	be	no	longer	a	spectator,	a	mere	‘tourist’,	but	to	respond,	to	be	a	morally	responsive	agent,	part	of	a	cosmos	that	is	shot	through	with	the	divine.																																																									35	The	Rule	of	St	Benedict,	dating	from	the	sixth	century	AD,	speaks	in	Chapter	58	of	a	conversatio	
morum,	a	difficult	term	to	translate,	but	one	which,	as	the	context	makes	clear,	implies	a	continuous	reshaping	and	renewal	of	one’s	habits	of	behaviour,	character	and	entire	way	of	life.	36	Psalm	29	[28]:	5-9.	My	discussion	of	this	and	the	following	examples	(from	Exodus	and	Isaiah)	of	spiritual	experience	as	it	figures	in	the	Bible	is	based	on	a	passage	from	Chapter	5	of	Cottingham,	How	
to	Believe.	37	Exodus	13:21;	16:10;	24:16.	38	Exodus	3:5.	39	Psalm	96	[95]:	11-13.	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 11		 The	upshot	of	all	this	is	that	spiritual	experience	in	what	I	have	been	calling	its	‘cosmic’	dimension	is,	in	today’s	somewhat	awkward	philosophical	jargon,	‘normative’:	we	are	dealing	with	intensely	personal	encounters,	infused	with	awe	and	charged	with	moral	significance,	where	the	individual	feels	him	or	herself	to	be	checked,	to	be	scrutinized,	and	to	be	called	upon	to	respond	and	to	change.		 In	the	work	of	many	creative	artists,	by	contrast,	particularly	in	the	last	two	centuries,	we	see	a	resistance	to	any	kind	of	alignment	between	art	and	morality.	Yet	one	can	certainly	point	to	some	non-religious	works	of	art	which	do	seem	to	have	a	morally	demanding	aspect40	And	it	is	also	true	that	certain	non-theistic	meditative	forms	of	spirituality	such	as	those	found	in	Buddhism	and	other	Eastern	traditions,	have	ethical	teachings	attached	to	them.	But	the	goals	that	are	sought	in	those	traditions,	and	enthusiastically	taken	up	by	the	secularists	we	referred	to	earlier	–	involving	notions	like	impersonal	and	boundless	oceanic	wellbeing	–	seem	to	have	an	essentially	quietist	character.	The	paramount	objective	is	achieving	bliss	by	detaching	oneself	from	the	stressful	world	of	struggle,	commitment	and	dependency.	To	be	sure,	many	of	the	Eastern	sages	are	famous	for	enjoining	right	conduct	and	the	practice	of	virtue,	so	in	this	sense	there	is	an	ethical	component	involved.	But	it	is	not	a	component	that	is	intrinsically	connected	to	the	underlying	vision	of	the	cosmos;	for	the	Eastern	vision	is	one	in	which	personal	commitments	and	demands	are	based	on	an	illusion,	and	ultimate	reality	is	simply	an	impersonal	continuum	of	conditions	that	arise	and	pass	away.	There	is	a	fundamental	contrast	here	with	the	kind	of	sacred	vision	found	in	some	of	the	passages	from	the	Bible	quoted	above,	or	with	that	of	Isaiah,	when	he	sees	the	temple	shaking	and	billowing	with	smoke,	and	the	earth	and	heaven	filled	with	God’s	glory	(here	again	we	have	the	term	that	is	so	prominent	in	Jewish	spirituality,	kavod).41	For	when	the	prophet	witnesses	this	vision,	his	first	reaction	is	to	cry	‘Woe	is	me!’	The	experience	he	has	involves	a	vivid	intermingling	of	the	aesthetic	with	the	moral,	and	even	as	he	is	overwhelmed	by	the	‘glory’,	he	acutely	feels	his	own	failures	and	those	of	his	people,	so	that	he	forthwith	resolves	to	try	to	set	things	right.	Such	a	vision,	radically	different	from	vague	oceanic	feelings	of	wellbeing	and	oneness,	is	a	‘normative’	vision	–	one	that	carries	with	it	inescapable	demands.	It	is	a	vision	that	makes	no	sense	without	the	two	poles	of	the	human	condition	that	Blaise	Pascal	underlined–	our	wretchedness,	or	sinfulness,	and	our	redeemability	would	we	but	turn	towards	the	good.42			
5	.Coda:	philosophy	and	the	spiritual	It	has	been	no	part	of	my	purpose	in	this	paper	to	disparage	the	recent	interest	in	spirituality	among	contemporary	atheist	thinkers	–	on	the	contrary,	I	think	it	is	thoroughly	to	be	welcomed.	But	the	favourable	interpretation	of	theistic	spirituality	offered	above,	together	with	the	reservations	expressed	about	alternative	non-theistic	forms,	may	suggest	to	some	readers	that	this	paper	has,	as	it	were,	imperialistic	ambitions,	and	aims	to	browbeat	those	who	describe	themselves	as	spiritual	into	admitting	that	they	are	really	theists	whether	they	know	it	or	not.	But	polemical	arguments	seldom	provide	much	enlightenment	in	philosophy,	and	would-be	coercive	philosophical	strategies	rarely	succeed	in	getting	anyone	to	shift	their	position.	What	I	have	been	aiming	to	do,	in	a	much	lower	key,	is	to	suggest	that	when	we																																																									40	A	possible	example	may	be	found	in	Rainer	Maria	Rilke’s	sonnet	Archaïscher	Torso	Apollos	[from	Der	
Neuen	Gedichte	anderer	Teil,	1908],	which	I	translate	and	discuss	in	‘The	Self,	The	Good	Life,	and	the	Transcendent’,	in	N.	Athanassoulis	and	S.	Vice	(ed.),	The	Moral	Life:	Essays	in	Honour	of	John	
Cottingham	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2007),	pp.	255-6.		41	Isaiah	6:	1-4.		42	Misère	de	l’homme	sans	Dieu	.	.	.	Félicité	de	l’homme	avec	Dieu.	Blaise	Pascal,	Pensées	[1670],	ed.	L.	Lafuma	(Paris:	Seuil,	1962),	no	6.	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 12	unpack	exactly	what	is	involved	in	the	activities	and	experiences	we	call	spiritual,	it	is	not	easy	to	make	fully	adequate	sense	of	spirituality,	and	of	its	importance	for	human	life,	without	a	something	very	close	to	a	theistic	framework.		The	theologian	Karl	Rahner	once	used	the	term	‘anonymous	Christians’	to	describe	those	who	do	not	adopt,	or	have	never	heard	of,	the	Christian	faith,	but	who	may	nevertheless	achieve	salvation	through	good	works	and	through	following	their	consciences,	albeit,	unbeknownst	to	them,	none	of	this	would	have	been	possible	but	for	the	salvific	sacrifice	of	Christ.43	The	phrase	‘anonymous	Christian’	is	a	controversial	one	which	has	irritated	many	critics,	but	for	present	purposes	we	may	perhaps	extract	from	it	a	simple	philosophical	point,	namely	that	one	may	respond	to	a	divine	reality	without	doing	so	under	that	description	(just	as	someone	may	be	aware	of	a	flash	of	lightening,	but	not	be	aware	of	it	under	the	description	‘electrical	discharge’).	Applying	this	to	case	in	hand,	the	gist	of	my	argument	has	been	that	the	profound	importance	for	human	life	of	those	deep	transformative	experiences	we	call	‘spiritual’,	together	with	the	moral	response	that	is	demanded	from	us	through	the	working	of	such	experiences,	provides	some	support	for	thinking	the	reality	glimpsed	in	such	experiences	is	of	the	kind	envisaged	by	a	theistic	worldview,	even	though	it	may	not	be	experienced	under	that	description.	For	either	the	moral	demand	is	an	illusion	(something	that	those	who	take	spiritual	experience	seriously	are	unlikely	to	want	to	say),	or	else	there	is	something	in	the	nature	of	the	cosmos	that	grounds	the	demand.	If	there	are	indeed	‘irreducibly	normative	truths’44	that	we	access	through	such	experiences	–	moral	truths,	in	other	words,	that	are	not	reducible	to	factual	truths	about	the	natural	world,	which	have	objective	authority	over	us	and	require	us	to	act	in	certain	ways	–	these	will	not	fit	easily	within	the	prevailing	naturalistic	conception	of	the	world	in	which	in	which	there	is	no	objective	source	of	authority	or	normativity,	and	where	the	only	ultimate	constituents	of	the	world	are	the	physical	objects	studied	by	science.45	All	this	brings	us	back,	in	conclusion,	to	the	role	of	philosophy	in	the	deeper	of	the	two	Socratic	senses	referred	to	at	the	start	of	this	paper,	namely	what	Pierre	Hadot	has	called	‘philosophy	as	a	way	of	life’	–	something	of	profound	moral	importance	that	impinges	on	the	entire	character	and	purpose	of	one’s	existence.46	In	this	deeper	sense,	philosophy	is	part	of	a	process	of	radical	interior	change	–	metanoia	is	the	Greek	term	–	a	change	of	heart,	a	change	of	the	kind	that	leads	to	a	fundamental	shift	in	the	flow	and	direction	of	one’s	life.47	As	we																																																									43	‘Anonymous	Christianity	means	that	a	person	lives	in	the	grace	of	God	and	attains	salvation	outside	of	explicitly	constituted	Christianity.	Let	us	take	a	Buddhist	monk,	who,	because	he	follows	his	conscience,	attains	salvation	and	lives	in	the	grace	of	God:	of	him	I	must	say	that	he	is	an	anonymous	Christian…	If	I	hold	that	everyone	depends	upon	Jesus	Christ	for	salvation,	and	if	at	the	same	time	I	hold	that	many	live	in	the	world	who	have	not	expressly	recognized	Jesus	Christ,	then	there	remains	in	my	opinion	nothing	else	but	to	take	up	this	postulate	of	an	anonymous	Christianity.’	Karl	Rahner	in	
Dialogue	(Spring	Valley,	NY:	Crossroads	Publishing,	1959),	p.	135	(slightly	adapted).	44	The	phrase	is	Derek	Parfit’s,	in	On	What	Matters	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	Part	II,	p.	464.	It	should	be	added	that	although	Parfit	recognizes	the	objectivity	and	‘irreducible	normativity’	of	these	authoritative	moral	demands,	he	denies	that	there	need	be	anything	whatsoever	in	reality	that	grounds	these	truths.	45	If	naturalism	fails,	it	is	of	course	theoretically	possible	that	the	ultimate	nature	of	the	cosmos	might	be	such	as	to	accommodate	other	realities,	of	a	non-theistic	kind	(such	as	Platonic	forms	perhaps),	which	might	ground	irreducibly	normative	truths	of	the	kind	accessed	in	spiritual	experience.	Another,	more	interesting	possibility	is	that	such	normativity	might	be	grounded	in	what	Fiona	Ellis	has	called	an	‘enriched’	or	‘expansive’	naturalism;	see	her	God,	Value,	and	Nature	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014).	These	possibilities	cannot	be	explored	and	evaluated	with	the	space	available	in	the	present	paper.	46	See	note	6,	above.	47	In	its	New	Testament	usage,	the	term	metanoia	may	be	translated	‘repentance’	or	‘conversion’;	cf.	Acts	of	the	Apostles:	‘God	hath	granted	repentance	unto	life’	(metanoian	eis	zoēn)’	(11:18).	
John	Cottingham,	Philosophy,	Religion	and	Spirituality		 13	have	seen,	spiritual	practice	in	its	traditional	forms	has	aimed	at	just	that	–	though	one	should	perhaps	add	that	philosophical	inquiry	tends	to	contribute	to	this	process	at	an	intellectual	and	reflective	level,	while	the	practices	of	spirituality	characteristically	engage	more	directly	with	a	whole	range	of	emotional,	imaginative	and	behavioural	responses.	But	the	truth	of	theism,	if	it	is	true,	completes	this	picture	in	the	most	satisfying	way	possible,	by	ensuring	that	the	process	of	change	has	an	ultimate	goal,	being	directed	towards	that	which	is	objectively	good	and	that	wherein	our	ultimate	fulfilment	lies.	Or,	to	close	with	a	phrase	from	Michel	Foucault,	‘there	is,	in	the	truth	and	in	the	access	to	it,	something	which	fulfils	the	subject	and	completes,	or	transfigures,	the	very	being	of	the	subject.’48	
																																																								48	Foucault,	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject,	p.	16.	I	am	most	grateful	to	the	editor	of	this	volume,	David	McPherson,	for	extremely	helpful	comments	on	an	earlier	draft	of	this	paper.	
